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POETRY AND SKIAGRAPHIA IN REPUBLIC X: 
A NEW ANALYSIS OF TRAGIC MIMESIS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Republic X Socrates accuses poetic “imitators” [µιµητικοί] of corrupting the soul (the 
psychological charge) and producing appearances that are far removed from truth (the 
metaphysical charge). The success of the psychological charge against mimetic poetry crucially 
depends on the success of the metaphysical charge; tragic poetry corrupts the soul by making 
images that are far removed from truth (that is, appearances of virtue and value). The dominant 
interpretive strategy cashes out the relationship between these two charges as follows: images 
corrupt the soul, because images are metaphysically inferior; all images are “far removed from 
truth” and hence potentially corruptive. Unfortunately, this strategy pits Book III against Book 
X; mimetic poetry forms the foundation of the guardians’ early education (in Book III), but 
mimetic poetry is corruptive (in Book X). 
In this paper I defend an alternative strategy. I contend that the metaphysical charge 
should be interpreted narrowly, to encompass false and illusory appearances of virtue and value 
produced via skiagraphic techniques. I argue that Socrates’ critique of tragedy and Homeric 
poetry does not rest on dubious metaphysical claims about images per se, but rather on the 
plausible and interesting claim that tragedians and their leader, Homer, employ skiagraphic 
techniques – that is, the manipulation of temporal distances and the contrasting of fortune with 
misfortune and virtue with vice - in order to produce powerful illusions of virtue and value. Even 
the denier of the Forms must take this claim seriously. I conclude with some thoughts about good 
mimesis and the importance of poetry to the larger project of the Republic. 
One of the greatest interpretive difficulties facing Republic X commentators is specifying 
what Socrates bans in Republic X. What is Socrates' target? At the outset of Book X Socrates 
 2 
remarks that they were right to ban “imitative” [µιµητική] poetry in light of the tripartite theory 
of the soul; such poetry corrupts the soul (595a-b). Socrates next proposes to define “mimesis as 
a whole”i [µίµησιν ὅλως], with a view to characterizing the imitative poet (595c). This proposal 
would be otiose, if Socrates had already defined 'mimesis as a whole' in Book III. While in Book 
III Socrates states that “to make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance is to imitate 
[µιµεῖσθαί] the person one makes oneself like” (393c4-5), this statement is not intended as a 
definition of 'mimesis as a whole.'ii Rather, impersonation is one type of mimesis, as evidenced 
by the fact that musical mode and meter also emerge in Book III as distinct forms of mimesis 
(399a-400a).iii Nor is impersonation the defining feature of imitative [µιµητική] poetry 
specifically. Whereas Socrates proposes to ban all imitative poetry, he does not ban all 
impersonation. In Book III and Book X Socrates permits impersonations of good men (397d, 
607a).iv Thus, given that some mimesis and some impersonation escape the ban, whom does 
Socrates banish in Book X?v My goal in this paper is to answer these questions through a new 
analysis of Republic X, which underscores Book X’s relation to the rest of the Republic, 
particularly Books III and IX. Drawing on Book IX, I argue that Socrates bans skiagraphic poets, 
particularly tragedians and their teacher, Homer. Tragedy and Homeric poetry utilize contrast and 
distancing techniques to produce false, corruptive appearances of virtue and value. Thus, Book X 
is consistent with Book III; some, not all, poetry is banned. 
 
1 THE PROBLEM: WHY ARE MIMETIC APPEARANCES CORRUPTIVE? 
Socrates defines the imitator [µιµητής] as one who produces appearances [φαινόµενα] of sensible 
particulars; the painter produces appearances of artifacts and craftsmen (597e-598c),vi and the 
poet produces appearances of agents and actions (599b).vii The imitator is like a man carrying a 
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mirror, who makes things appear (596d-e). In contrast, craftsmen produce an artifact “of like 
character as” [τοιοῦτον] its Form [τὸ ὄν], albeit not “completely” [τελέως] its Form (597a).viii 
Similarly, agents produce actions and deeds, rather than imitations thereof (599b).  
 It is not immediately obvious how this characterization of painting  – as producing the 
appearances of sensible particulars – carries over to poetry. What is the poet's correlate of the 
painter's bed? According to some, the analogy with painting is deeply flawed; nothing 
corresponds to the painter's bed.ix The poet does not, in the manner of the painter, produce 
appearances of sensible particulars. Rather, the poet produces the general “look” or “feel” of 
agents in action, as well as appearances of goodness and badness (of said agents and actions).x 
 This criticism is too quick. In Socrates’ view, both poet and painter convey generalities 
through producing appearances of particulars. In books II-III Socrates claims Greek poetry 
produces “appearances” of particular historical events and persons – that is, historical events and 
persons as imagined by the poet. This is not to deny that poems about the ancient past are poems 
about virtue and value. As Socrates himself emphasizes, it is through portraying highly esteemed 
personages (that is, heroes or gods) that poems about the ancient past represent and recommend 
general ways of life (388d). Certainly, Homer's image of Achilles does not relate to an actually 
existing person in the same way that the painting of Socrates’ bed relates to Socrates’ bed. 
However, a painting of an imagined bed is parallel to the poetic representation of Achilles; each 
represents an imagined particular.xi A further parallel is this: like poems, paintings produce 
general images of goodness. According to Socrates, the painting of a carpenter or a cobbler is an 
appearance of good carpentry or cobblery.xii In Socrates’ view, both poetry and painting 
communicate axiological ideas about what is worthwhile and agathological ideas what is good or 
virtuous. In other words, both poetry and painting express axiological and agathological 
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generalities through producing appearances of particulars.xiii 
 While in Books II-III Socrates suggests that Greek poets radically misrepresent the 
ancient past (and hence have no, or at least flawed, cognitive access to the past), he does not 
linger on this point.xiv According to Socrates, even if Greek poets are correct about the ancient 
past (for example, Cronos really did castrate his father), their poems must be banned, lest they 
produce a corruptive appearance of how one ought to live (377e-378c).xv Given Socrates' focus 
on the psychological and behavioral effects of poetry, it is no surprise that Socrates sets aside the 
difficult epistemological question (addressed in the Ion) of whether and how the poet has 
cognitive access to the ancient past. Since the primary task of Book X is to demonstrate how 
tragedy and Homeric poetry corrupt the soul, Socrates focuses on tragedy's appearances of virtue 
and value, rather than tragedy's appearances of past particulars. The former – and not the latter – 
are immediately relevant to demonstrating how tragedy corrupts the soul.xvi  
 However, well before Socrates accuses tragic poetry of corrupting the soul, Socrates 
denigrates the µιµητικός for producing appearances that are “far removed from truth” (598b4). 
Thus, the metaphysical charge that such appearances are far removed from truth is distinct from 
the psychological charge that tragic poetry corrupts the soul. Nevertheless, the success of the 
psychological charge against tragic poetry depends on the success of the metaphysical charge. 
This is because tragic poetry corrupts the soul “by making images that are far removed from 
truth” [εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα τοῦ … ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα] (605b). Tragic poetry 
corrupts the soul by producing appearances of virtue and value.xvii Thus, the success of the 
psychological charge depends on the success of the metaphysical charge.  
 How are tragedy’s appearances “far removed” from truth? After all, given that the 
imitator, including the tragedian, produces appearances of likenesses of Forms, aren’t mimetic 
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appearances relevantly related to truth? If, in producing appearances, the imitator simply mirrors 
sensible reality (as the mirror analogy suggests), then the imitator’s work is “trivial,” but 
certainly not corruptive.xviii In addressing this problem, the dominant interpretive strategy has 
been to suggest that images corrupt the soul, because images are metaphysically inferior. In other 
words, the metaphysical charge is ordinarily interpreted very broadly, to encompass all images; 
all images are “far removed from truth” and hence potentially corruptive. Unfortunately, this 
strategy fails to account for the fact that in Book X Socrates targets tragedy and Homeric poetry 
specifically, permitting painting and even some poetry. Even worse, this strategy pits Book III 
against Book X; mimesis and poetry form the foundation of the guardians’ education in Book III, 
only to come under attack in Book X.  
In what follows I shall outline an alternative strategy, concluding with what is wrong (and 
what is right) with the dominant interpretive strategy. I contend that the metaphysical charge 
should be interpreted narrowly, to encompass the false and illusory appearances produced by 
skiagraphia. While I do not deny that all images are, in some sense, “removed from truth,” I 
maintain that only skiagraphic images of virtue and value are removed from truth in the relevant 
way – that is, in a potentially corruptive way. For this reason, only skiagraphic images of virtue 
and value are banned, and Books III and X are consistent.  
 
2 FALSE APPEARANCES AND SKIAGRAPHIA: CORRUPTING THE SOUL 
Although Socrates sets out to define “mimesis as a whole,” he does not ban all mimesis. For 
this reason, we should expect Socrates to differentiate banned mimesis from mimesis in general. 
And indeed, after characterizing all imitators and all mimesis in terms of the mirror analogy (so 
as to show that all imitators produce images), Socrates “distinguishes” [διορίζει] imitating 
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sensibles “as they appear” [οἷα φαίνεται] and “as they are” [οἷα ἔστιν] (598a2). According to 
Socrates, Greek painters and poets imitate sensibles as they appear, not as they are. Socrates 
explains:  
- Now, tell me this about the painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the 
 thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen?  
 - The works of craftsmen.  
 - As they are or as they appear [οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται]? For you must yet distinguish 
 this [τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον].xix 
 - How do you mean? 
 - Like this. If you look at a bed from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a 
 different bed each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? 
 And is that also the case with other things? 
 - That's the way it is – it appears different without being so.  
 - Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that 
 which is as it is [τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει], or does it imitate that which appears as it appears [τὸ 
 φαινόµενον, ὡς φαίνεται]? Is it an imitation of appearances [φαντάσµατος] or of truth 
 [ἀληθείας]?  
 - Of appearances [φαντάσµατος].  
 - Then imitation [µιµητική] is far removed from truth [τοῦ ἀληθοῦς], for it touches only a 
 small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image [εἴδωλον]. And that, it 
 seems, is why it can produce everything (597e8-598b6).  
 
How should we interpret this “further distinction?” Commentators emphasize that Socrates 
distinguishes µιµητική (from mimesis more generally) as the practice of “copying” appearances, 
as opposed to merely producing appearances.xx The practitioner of µιµητική, the µιµητικός, is 
unique in that she imitates appearances.xxi On this reading, Socrates targets mimesis that imitates 
appearances. The µιµητικός is “two removes from truth,” in virtue of reproducing appearances of 
likenesses of Forms.  
Of course, this cannot be the entire story. While I agree that the µιµητικός reproduces 
appearances, I deny that the µιµητικός is in the business of reproducing any and all 
appearances.xxii I will argue that Socrates’ attention to skiagraphia suggests that the µιµητικός is a 
skiagraphic artist, who utilizes popular skiagraphic techniques to reproduce false or illusory 
appearances. One prima facie advantage of this interpretation is that it connects Book IX to Book 
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X. In Book IX Socrates compares mixed pleasures to skiagraphia, only to extend this analogy to 
tragedy and Homeric poetry in Book X.xxiii By juxtaposing pleasure with pain, mixed pleasures 
produce the false appearance of great intensity (583b, 584a, 586a-c). In Book X Socrates further 
develops this analogy with skiagraphia: by imitating varied [ποικίλα] characters (and their varied 
fortunes and misfortunes), tragedy produces false appearances of the magnitudes of goodness 
and badness. 
Not only does my interpretation have the benefit of preserving continuity between Books 
IX and X, it has the added benefit of harmonizing Books III and X; both books attack false 
poetic images, not images per se. In Book III Socrates refers to Homer, Hesiod and other 
censored poets as “making an image” [εἰκάζειν] of what heroes and gods are like (377d9), with 
an important caveat: such poets construct their images “badly” [κακῶς], in that their images are 
not at all like [ὅµοια] what they purport to be images of. In other words, µιµητικοί like Homer 
reproduce false images. Book X goes beyond Book III in articulating how such images corrupt 
the soul. Moreover, although Book X critiques tragedy, Socrates explicitly targets Homer, qua 
“leader” of the tragedians (595b-c). This is because tragedians draw on Homer to produce 
mimetic appearances, and Book X is concerned with the production and reception of mimetic 
appearances, rather than the mimetic impersonation of particular characters.xxiv       
My analysis will proceed as follows: first, I will say a word about the content of banned 
poetry, characterizing the kinds of illusions such poetry produces. Next, I will turn to the 
techniques of the µιµητικοί, where my focus will be on the methods µιµητικοί employ to produce 
poetic illusions. Attention to the latter will reveal that Socrates does not attack poetic images per 
se, but rather false, skiagraphic poetic images. Finally, I will return to versions of the dominant 
view, pointing out what is right and what is wrong with these analyses. I will conclude with some 
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thoughts about good mimesis, the place of Book X in the larger project of the Republic and an 
important consequence of my interpretation: even the denier of the Forms must take Socrates’ 
critique of tragic poetry seriously. 
 
2.1 Poetry and Axiological Illusion  
According to Socrates, tragic and epic poetry produce agathological and axiological “illusions” 
[φαντάσµατα, εἴδωλα].xxv Poetic images of revered heroes lamenting the loss of external goods 
(fame, fortune, family, etc.) create the illusion that a “noble man” [κάλος] suffers horribly and 
that lamentation is a “worthy” [ἄξιον] response to such “terrible” [δεινόν] loss (387d-e, 388d). In 
truth, however, only the loss of internal goods (virtue or soul health) is terrible for a human 
being. What is more, a truly noble man is not excitable, irritable and “variable” [ποικίλος]. 
Rather, he is “most self-sufficient in living well” (387d11) - which is to say, for the noble man, 
“living well” is an outward expression of his internal excellence (rather than the outward 
possession of external goods). In contrast to Achilles, a man of true virtue quietly endures 
disenfranchisement, dishonor and even death, lest violent lamentation corrupt his soul. Because 
his tame emotions and desires follow reason’s stable and unified vision of the good, the man of 
virtue is not variable but “remains pretty well the same” (604e1).xxvi 
 Also, µιµητικοίxxvii produce the appearance that their poems are fine or beautiful [καλά], 
which creates the illusion that the poet is knowledgeable about that which he imitates (that is, 
virtue and value). In effect, the poem’s appearance of fineness intensifies the axiological and 
agathological illusions therein. Socrates remarks at 601e4-b5: 
 Then shall we conclude that all poetic imitators [ποιητικοὺς µιµητάς], beginning with  
 Homer, imitate images of virtue [εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς] and all the other things they write about  
 and have no grasp of truth? As we were saying just now, a painter, though he knows  
nothing about cobblery, can make was seems to be [δοκοῦντα] a cobbler to those who 
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know as little about it as he does and who judge things by their colors and shapes. … And 
in the same way, I suppose we’ll say that a poetic imitator [ποιητικόν] uses words and 
phrases to paint colored pictures of each of the crafts. He himself knows nothing about 
them, but he imitates [µιµεῖσθαι] them in such a way that others, as ignorant as he, who 
judge by words, will think he speaks extremely well [πάνυ εὖ] about cobblery or 
generalship or anything else whatever, provided – so great is the natural charm of these 
things – that he speaks with meter, rhythm, and harmony, for if you strip a poet’s works of 
their musical colorings and take them by themselves, I think you know what they look like. 
You’ve surely seen them. … Don’t they resemble the faces of young boys who are neither 
fine nor beautiful [καλῶν] after the bloom of youth has left them?  
 
Just as the painter makes what seems to be a cobbler, the imitative poet makes what seems to be 
a virtuous man. Furthermore, the apparent fineness or beauty of the artwork supports and 
sustains the artwork’s illusions. Crucially, medium informs content.xxviii Μιµητικοί use music and 
meter to dress up their work, such that it falsely appears to reflect real ethical expertise. 
Similarly, the “bloom of youth” [ἄνθος] dresses up the inherent ugliness of a boy, such that he 
falsely appears beautiful (601b).  
 
2.2 Skiagraphia: Painting 
What is skiagraphic painting [σκιαγραφία]? In the absence of extant examples of skiagraphia, art 
historians and archaeologists have wrangled over the exact nature of the practice. Drawing on a 
dearth of textual evidence, most scholars have postulated that skiagraphia essentially involved 
juxtaposing colors and shades to produce the optical illusion of three-dimensional reality.xxix 
However, others have hypothesized that skiagraphia is a form of divisionism or a means of 
intensifying colors through the juxtaposition thereof.xxx In the absence of any extant Greek 
skiagraphia, it has been difficult to settle the debate.  
However, the relatively recent discovery of Macedonian tomb paintings provides support 
for the view that skiagraphia essentially involved the modulation of shade and light so as to 
create the illusion of depth. Breaking conventional outlines and, in some cases, violating 
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traditional tetrachromy, these wall paintings use tone mixtures and shadowing to produce the 
illusion of a three-dimensional reality, when viewed at a suitable distance (Plantzos, 172-9).xxxi 
Plato associates the practice with juxtaposition (584a, 586a-c; Philebus 42b-c), distancing (523b; 
Parmenides 165b-d; Theaetetus 208e; Philebus 42b-c), and deceptive illusion (365c, 583b, 586a-
c; Laws 663b; Phaedo 69b; Theaetetus 208e; Philebus 42b-c).xxxii The dialogues presuppose a 
shared knowledge of popular skiagraphia, frequently appealing to the practice in order to explain 
ethical illusion.xxxiii  
Why suppose Book X targets skiagraphic painting, as opposed to painting entire? The 
best clues come at 602c-d, where Socrates claims that the µιµητικοί appeal to a part of the soul 
that forms beliefs on the basis of the following sorts of optical illusions: 
Something looked at from close at hand doesn’t seem to be the same size as it does when 
it is looked at from a distance. … And something looks crooked when seen in water and 
straight when seen out of it, while something else looks both concave and convex 
because our eyes are deceived by its colors [χρώµατα], and every other similar sort of 
confusion is clearly present in our soul. And it is because they exploit this weakness in 
our nature that skiagraphic painting [σκιαγραφία], conjuring, and other forms of trickery 
have powers that are little short of magical.  
 
Remarkably, the µιµητικοί appeal to a part of the soul that forms beliefs on the basis of 
skiagraphic painting and optical illusions of size and shape, which manipulate colors and 
distances to deceive our eyes. Here, Socrates invokes the very techniques Plato and others 
associate with popular skiagraphic painters – that is, distancing and manipulation of color or 
light to produce illusions of size and shape. If Socrates had intended to target traditional, two-
dimensional painting, why would he claim that the mimetic painter appeals to a part of the soul 
that is susceptible to optical illusions produced via coloring and distancing techniques? Why 
would he actually employ the term “skiagraphia” (above)? Another indication that Socrates 
confines his critique to popular skiagraphia occurs earlier in the argument, at 598b-c: 
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… we say that a painter can pain a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, even 
though he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a good painter and 
displays his painting at a distance, he can deceive children and foolish people into 
thinking that it is truly [ἀληθῶς εἶναι] a carpenter.xxxiv  
 
Again, realistic, skiagraphic mural paintings fit Socrates’ description, in that they would have 
produced the illusion of three-dimensional reality when viewed at a distance.xxxv 
 What does skiagraphic painting have to do with poetry? Poetry does not produce the 
illusion of three-dimensional reality. Here it is important to take a cue from Republic IX, which 
offers a schema for how to interpret Socrates’ skiagraphia analogies. Tragedy and Homeric 
poetry are analogous to skiagraphic painting not so much in the kind of illusion it produces 
(though there are some parallelsxxxvi), but more in how it produces its illusion; namely, through 
distancing and contrast techniques. In the next section, I examine how Socrates develops the 
skiagraphia analogy with respect to pleasure (in Book IX) and poetry (in Book X). I argue that 
Socrates’ critique of tragedy does not rest on dubious metaphysical claims about images, but 
rather on the plausible claim that tragedians manipulate temporal distances and contrast fortune 
with misfortune and virtue with vice in order to produce agathological and axiological illusions. 
Even the denier of the Forms must take this claim seriously.  
 
2.3 Skiagraphia: Pleasure, Poetry and Poikilia 
I now turn to Socrates’ skiagraphia analogies. First, I examine skiagraphic pleasure in Book IX. 
Next, I turn to Book X, with a view to articulating the sense in which tragic poetry is 
skiagraphic. Book X’s comparison of tragedy to skiagraphic painting and emphasis on deceptive 
contrasting and distancing techniques (familiar to us from Book IX’s skiagraphic analysis of 
pleasure) strongly suggest that tragedy and its predecessor, Homeric poetry, are problematically 
skiagraphic.  
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 In Book IX Socrates explicitly invokes skiagraphia at 586b7-c1, summarizing his 
analysis of ‘mixed pleasures’ (that is, pleasures arising from the cessation of painsxxxvii) as 
follows: 
 Then isn’t it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains,  
mere images and skiagraphia [ἐσκιαγραφηµέναις] of true pleasures? And doesn’t the 
juxtaposition [ἀποχραινοµέναις xxxviii] of these pleasures and pains make them appear 
intense, so that they give rise to mad erotic passions in the foolish … ? 
 
Mixed pleasures are like skiagraphia’s color mixtures; both produce illusions through 
juxtaposition or contrast. However, in Book IX Socrates is less interested in skiagraphia’s 
illusions of three-dimensional reality and more interested in skiagraphia’s illusions of color 
intensity.xxxix Consider another color parallel at 584e6-585a5: 
Is it any surprise, then, if those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound opinions 
about lots of other things as well, or that they are so disposed to pleasure, pain, and the 
intermediate state that, when they descend to the painful, they believe truly and are really 
in pain, but that, when they ascend from the painful to the intermediate state, they firmly 
believe that they have reached fulfillment and pleasure? They are inexperienced in 
pleasure and so are deceived when they compare pain to painlessness, just as they would 
be if they compared black to grey without having experienced white.  
 
In effect, Socrates tightens the analogy with skiagraphia, for the purposes of explicating hedonic 
illusion. Both skiagraphia and mixed pleasures achieve their illusions through juxtaposition. The 
neutral hedonic state (cessation of pain and pleasure) appears pleasurable to those in pain and 
painful to those in pleasure (583d-584a). It is important to note that the illusion in question is not 
an ontological illusion; there really is a color or a hedonic state. The illusion is an illusion of 
magnitude, produced in virtue of a contrast. The analysis of mixed pleasures in the Philebus 
illuminates this point: 
Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a 
distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this 
same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures? … Because they [mixed pleasures] 
are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the 
pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and 
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the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they. … They 
both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them 
this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, 
nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which 
corresponds to this is true or real (41e10-42c3).xl  
 
Both contrast and distance condition our perception of the felt magnitudes of pleasure and pain; 
distancing and contrasting produce hedonic illusion. The experiencer’s pleasures and pains are 
genuine hedonic states, but when contrasted and brought close, they appear and feel greater than 
they really are. Ultimately, such illusions are effective because their subject is positioned far 
from truth in the following sense: 
Therefore, those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always occupied 
with feasts and the like, are brought down and then back up to the middle, as it seems, 
and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly 
higher up, never looking up at it or being brought up to it, and so they aren’t filled with 
that which really is and never taste any stable or pure pleasure. Instead, they always look 
down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table, they feed, 
fatten, and fornicate. To outdo others in these things, they kick and butt them with iron 
horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For the part that 
they’re trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes, and neither it nor the things they are 
trying to fill it with are among the things that are (585e5-586b4).  
 
Because the subject is far from Forms (and the pure and stable pleasure of knowing Forms), she 
cannot dispel hedonic illusions. Just as skiagraphia’s ontological illusions are effective so long as 
the viewer beholds the work in a place that is distant from the painting, so too mixed pleasures’ 
illusions are effective so long as the experiencer regards such pleasures in a place that is distant 
from Truth. 
 In the hedonic case, only the unique epistemic and hedonic situation of the subject 
determines the particular contrasts and distances that condition her experience of pleasure and 
pain. The painting and poetry cases are importantly different, in that the skiagraphic painter or 
poet determines the contrasts and distances that condition a spectator’s experience of the work.xli  
In addition to Socrates’ comparison of tragic poetry to skiagraphic painting, his focus on 
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“poikilia” (in connection with tragic poetry) suggests that skiagraphic contrasts are essential to 
his conception of popular tragedy and Homeric poetry. Greek metallurgy (toreutics and jewelry), 
weaving and painting produced poikilia-type artifacts, including skiagraphia.xlii Commonly 
characterized by color contrasts, such poikilia involved the inlaying or meshing of varied 
substances, shapes and/or color threads, so as to create a contrastive, brilliant and striking effect. 
Greek literature frequently associates the seductive power of poikilia with their complexity and 
extends the concept to wily, enchanting and variable Gods and heroes (Grand-Clemént, 407 & 
411-16).xliii Despite the popularity of poikilia, Plato harbored a deep suspicion of poikilia – a 
suspicion borne out in his characterization of popular poetic mimesis as “ποικίλη” (Grand-
Clemént, 415-16). 
  According to Socrates, the popular poet imitates the “excitable and multicolored 
character” [τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος]. The ποικίλον character is easy to imitate 
and readily recognizable by “a crowd consisting of all sorts of people” (604e-605a).xliv The 
ποικίλος man is the democrat, whom Socrates describes in Book VIII: 
And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he drinks 
heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet; 
sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, he’s idle and neglects 
everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy. 
He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever 
comes into his mind. If he happens to admire soldiers, he’s carried in that direction, if 
moneymakers, in that one. There’s neither order nor necessity in his life, but he calls it 
pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and he follows it for as long as he lives. … I also 
suppose that he’s a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, fine and multicolored 
[ποικίλον], just like the democratic city, and that many men and women might envy his 
life, since it contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living (561c5-e6). 
 
Socrates likens the democratic city to poikilia; in particular, to a garish “coat embroidered with 
every kind of ornament” (557c4). Most people erroneously judge the coat to be most beautiful, 
because they are bewitched by its color contrasts (557c5-7). As we saw in Socrates’ analysis of 
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mixed pleasures, color and pleasure contrasts intensify the contrasted members. Similarly, 
variability in the democrat’s actions and character create contrasts that amplify aspects of her 
action and character, such that she and her actions appear finer than they really are. What is 
more, ποικίλα characters and actions appear most fine to the majority. Thus, in imitating the 
democratic character and mode of life, the poetic imitator is “imitating sensibles as they appear” 
(to the democratic majority), rather than as they are. These imitated appearances are skiagraphic 
illusions, insofar as they arise from contrasts.  
 Notably, tragic mimesis takes on the character of what is imitated; the mimesis is itself 
multicolored [ποικίλη] (604e1). Poetic images of good and bad and virtue and vice comingle to 
create agathological and axiological illusions. Consider the tragic, Homeric hero Achilles, the 
poetic representations of whom Socrates most severely censors.xlv The character and life of 
Achilles contain dazzling contrasts and, as a result, great skiagraphic illusion. The mercy 
Achilles shows Priam in returning Hector’s corpse only appears intensely noble when juxtaposed 
with Achilles’ prior, violent treatment of Hector’s corpse. Similarly, Achilles’ bravery in battle 
only appears spectacularly noble when juxtaposed with Achilles’ former, petulant refusal to join 
the war efforts. What is more, Achilles’ misfortunes – in particular, the death of his beloved 
Patroclus and his own eventual death in battle – appear all the more terrible in contrast to 
Achilles’ previous glory and good fortune. Thus, it is no wonder that skiagraphic poets like 
Homer imitate Achilles and other poikila characters; such characters and lives contain the very 
sorts of skiagraphic contrasts that amplify illusory appearances of virtue and misfortune and, by 
extension, the audience’s problematic emotional engagement with tragedy, which nourishes the 
“pitying part” of the human soul (606b). In short, tragedy deals in skiagraphic contrasts. It buys 
its great illusions and great emotional power with the currency of poikilia. This, I take it, is a 
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main pillar of Socrates’ critique of tragedy. The other pillar of Socrates’ critique is beyond the 
scope of this paper; namely, an analysis of how, exactly, tragedy’s ethical illusions enlarge and 
corrupt the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul.xlvi Nevertheless, unlike mere ‘images of 
sensible particulars’, ethical, skiagraphic illusions are a much better candidate for being the kind 
of thing that can plausibly corrupt the soul.  
 Finally, tragedians also manipulate temporal distances in order to magnify human good 
and bad. To see this, consider how “rational calculation” dispels the illusion of tragic misfortune: 
First, it isn’t clear whether such things will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, 
it doesn’t make the future any better to take them hard; third, human affairs aren’t worth 
taking very seriously; and, finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need in such 
circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible … . Deliberation. We must 
accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then arrange our affairs in 
whatever way reason determines to be best. We mustn’t hug the hurt part and spend our 
time weeping and wailing like children when they trip. Instead, we should always 
accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the 
disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure (604b8-d1).  
 
Whereas the skiagraphic painter positions his painting far from the viewer, the skiagraphic poet 
positions human good and bad close to the audience. This closeness is a temporal closeness, in 
that it conveniently deletes the future, failing to capture a complete human life, within which the 
true sizes of goods and bads may be calculated. But there is another sort of closeness at issue 
here – one that should recall Socrates’ caustic remarks about the blind pursuer of mixed 
pleasures (585e5-586b4). Unable to occupy the timeless vantage point of intelligible Truth, 
which properly captures the cosmic insignificance of human beings, the hedonist embroils 
herself in “human affairs” - feeding, fattening, fornicating and killing others in her blind pursuit 
of false pleasures. Hence, by positioning his audience so temporally close to human calamities, 
the tragedian effectively distances his audience from the vantage point of intelligible Truth, not 
unlike how the intense experience of mixed pleasures distances one from true, pure pleasures.xlvii  
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 In sum, tragedians are analogous to the skiagraphic painter in that they employ contrast 
techniques and manipulate distances in order to create and sustain skiagraphic illusions. 
Tragedy’s illusions are agathological and axiological in nature; through contrasting good and bad 
and manipulating temporal distances, Greek tragic drama (which draws heavily on Homer) 
constructs a false reality concerning value (for example, that the noble Achilles undergoes a 
terrible misfortune). In like manner, the skiagraphic painter contrasts colors and manipulates 
spatial distances in order to create and sustain illusions of color intensity and a false reality 
concerning ontology (for example, that the painting of a bed is truly a bed). This interpretation of 
Socrates’ analysis of tragedy receives support from Socrates’ focus on skiagraphia and poikilia 
in the latter books of the Republic. In addition, it has the added benefit of making Plato’s views 
on tragedy more intelligible. The idea that tragic drama relies for its power on contrasts is an 
interesting one, as is the suggestion that such contrasts create ethical illusions – illusions that 
have the potential to corrupt the human soul. Moreover, we are now in a position to appreciate 
why imitative poetry corrupts the soul by producing images. Such poetry utilizes skiagraphic 
techniques to produce ethical illusions; and, unlike images of sensible particulars, ethical 
illusions can plausibly corrupt the soul.xlviii 
I will end by examining other interpretive strategies and situating Socrates’ critique of 
poetry within the larger context of the Republic.  
 
3 THE DOMINANT INTERPRETATION 
The dominant interpretive strategy locates poetry’s allegedly corrupting nature in the intrinsic 
deceptiveness of images; by their very nature, images mislead or distort. Poetry corrupts 
audiences by producing images of virtue and value, which, due to their metaphysical status qua 
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images, necessarily deceive viewers about virtue and value. 
Time-crunched readers may skip section 3 and proceed to the conclusion on p. 23. 
3.1 The Incompleteness Interpretation 
I shall dub the first version of this interpretive strategy the “Incompleteness Interpretation” (II). 
According to II, images are inherently deceptive insofar as they are “incomplete” and hence 
“deficient.”xlix Consider again the following passage: 
 - Now, tell me this about the painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the 
 thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen?  
 - The works of craftsmen.  
 - As they are or as they appear [οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται]? For you must yet distinguish 
 this [τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον]. 
 - How do you mean? 
 - Like this. If you look at a couch from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a 
 different couch each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? 
 And is that also the case with other things? 
 - That's the way it is – it appears different without being so.  
 - Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that 
 which is as it is [τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει], or does it imitate that which appears as it appears [τὸ 
 φαινόµενον, ὡς φαίνεται]? Is it an imitation of appearances [φαντάσµατος] or of truth 
 [ἀληθείας]?  
 - Of appearances [φαντάσµατος].  
 - Then imitation [µιµητική] is far removed from truth [τοῦ ἀληθοῦς], for it touches only a 
 small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image [εἴδωλον]. And that, it 
 seems, is why it can produce everything (597e8-598b6).  
 
On the basis of this passage, one might reasonably infer that mimetic images are “two removes 
from truth,” because they are incomplete and hence deficient. Indeed, in the Cratylus Socrates 
insists that images are incomplete of their very nature; if an image of Cratylus presented every 
detail of Cratylus, it would be a Cratylus duplicate, not an image of Cratylus (432b-d). Thus, 
necessarily, mimetic appearances do not present truth in its entirety. A mimetic appearance only 
provides a single perspective (that is, an “incomplete view”) of that which it imitates. The 
painting only presents one angle of the couch; similarly, the poem only presents one angle on 
virtue. Insofar as foolish audiences suppose that poems supply them with a complete picture of 
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virtue, they are deceived. II not only specifies the sense in which mimetic images are “less true” 
than that which they imitate; it also explains why imitative poetry corrupts the soul. To the extent 
that “foolish people” suppose that incomplete appearances of virtue and value represent the 
entire truth about virtue and value, they develop a superficial and ultimately damaging 
conception of how to live. Hence, II nicely ties the ontological inferiority of appearances (that is, 
their being “incomplete”) to their capacity to mislead audiences about virtue and value.  
 However, II does not capture the structure of Socrates’ argument. Socrates seeks to 
establish that Homer is a µιµητικός by demonstrating that he lacks both knowledge and correct 
opinion about that which he purports to imitate; namely, “what ways of life that make people 
better in public or private” (599d3-4). If II were correct, then the structure of Socrates’ argument 
would likely be very different; having defined µιµητικοί as producers of something incomplete, 
Socrates would have next pointed out that poetic µιµητικοί produce incomplete representations 
of virtue and value (epistemological arguments aside). Instead, Socrates argues that poetic 
µιµητικοί are completely ignorant about virtue and value, for which reason they employ 
skiagraphic techniques to produce illusory images of virtue and value. Moreover, such images 
are not incorrect in virtue of their incompleteness, but in virtue of their skiagraphic nature. And 
indeed, the Cratylus sharply distinguishes between the incompleteness of an image and its 
correctness or incorrectness; whereas all images are incomplete, only some lack correctness 
[ὀρθότης] (432b-c). 
3.2 The Multiplicity Interpretation 
How can the painting of the couch misrepresent the couch, in the way that Homer's poetry 
misrepresents virtue and value? The “Multiplicity Interpretation” (MI) addresses this question. 
According to MI, images necessarily misrepresent or distort sensible particulars in the same way 
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that sensible particulars misrepresent or distort Forms. Just as the many perspectival appearances 
of the couch are “varied, changing and contradictory” with respect to the single sensible couch 
(of which they are appearances), the many sensible couches are “varied, changing and 
contradictory” with respect to the Form of the couch. Similarly, just as a sensible couch is 
“stable, uniform and consistent” with respect to the many perspectival appearances of it, the 
Form of the couch is “stable, uniform and consistent” with respect to the many sensible couches.l 
The Divided Line seems to support this interpretation; sensible particulars are to Forms as 
sensible particulars are to images, with regard to truth (510a-b). In short, an image is removed 
from truth in the same way that a sensible particular is removed from truth; presumably, by being 
varied, changing and contradictory with regard to the relatively stable, uniform and consistent 
object to which it is related. Further support for this interpretation may be found in the fact that 
the poets portray the “multicolored” [ποικίλον] and “excitable” [ἀγανακτητικόν] character, 
whose various representations are changing and contradictory (604d-605a). Thus, poetic 
imitations of virtue are varied and changing with respect to their relatively uniform, stable and 
consistent object; namely, the good and rational character, who remains the same. As such, 
poetic imitations of virtue necessarily mislead (and hence corrupt) ignorant audiences, who are 
led to mistake multiple mimetic images of a good character for the real thing. Additionally, in 
Book III Socrates criticizes the poets for being “multiply imitative” – that is, for imitating in 
voice and body many different things (395a), as opposed to singly imitating the good person 
(397d). Quite possibly, Socrates also faults the poets for producing competing and contradictory 
images of virtue and value.li  
 Despite MI’s initial attractiveness, the central assumption – namely, that sensible 
particulars are “removed from” Forms in the same way that skiagraphic illusions are removed 
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from sensible particulars - is, I think, mistaken. This assumption stems from supposing that there 
is no relevant difference between the mimetic artist’s skiagraphic illusions [εἴδωλα] and the 
images [εἰκόνας] that occupy the bottom section of the Divided Line. However, for Socrates, a 
sensible instance of justice, courage, or temperance is like the Form of Justice, Courage, or 
Temperance (respectively). lii However, as I have argued, an incorrect skiagraphic appearance of 
justice, courage, or temperance radically misrepresents and is fundamentally unlike that which it 
purports to be an image of (even if it bears certain similarities to the original). Censored poets are 
censored precisely because they construct their images such that they are not at all like [ὅµοια] 
their originals (that is, gods and heroes) (377d9). In other words, MI makes no room for the 
crucial distinction that sits at the heart of Socrates’ argument; namely, the distinction between 
correct and incorrect images. Skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value corrupt the soul, 
because skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value are incorrect. In contrast, correct images of 
virtue and value actually improve the soul, as evidenced by their prominent role in the education 
of the young (and, for that matter, in Plato’s dialogues more generally). 
A secondary problem with MI is this: If the relationship between Forms and sensibles and 
sensibles and images were one of radical distortion (as MI suggests), we should expect the 
kallipolis to be constructed very differently. First, the guardians would be banned from 
consuming any images of virtue, in poetry or otherwise, lest they come to accept 
misrepresentations of virtue. Second, a philosopher-king's knowledge of the Forms would not 
qualify him or her to rule in the sensible realm, since knowledge of F would not necessarily 
enable one to identify a sensible instance of F (the latter being a radical distortion or gross 
misrepresentation of the Form of F). However, the kallipolis is not structured in this way. 
Consumption of correct images of good characters (in the form of poetry) is an integral part of 
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the guardians’ early education. Also, the philosopher-king's knowledge of the Forms uniquely 
qualifies him or her to rule in the sensible realm. A final passage nicely illustrates the point that 
sensible particulars and images [εἰκόνες] are likenesses of truthliii:  
 … am I not right in saying that neither we, nor the guardians we are raising, will be 
 educated in music and poetry until we know the different Forms of moderation, courage, 
 frankness, high-mindedness, and all their kindred, and their opposites too, which are 
 moving around everywhere, and see them in the things in which they are, both 
 themselves and their images [εἰκόνας] … (402c1-6).  
 
In sum, in addition to failing to make room for Socrates’ distinction between correct and 
incorrect images, MI also commits its adherents to an independently implausible interpretation of 
the Republic.   
 That said, II and MI do get something right, which explains their initial plausibility. 
Images are incomplete and multiple, and these very features distance them from truth or the 
Forms. However, the same can be said of sensible particulars. Just as the incompleteness and 
multiplicity of images presents a danger (insofar as images are mistaken for truth), the 
incompleteness and multiplicity of sensible particulars presents a danger (insofar as sensibles are 
mistaken for truth). The Lover of Sights and Sounds exemplifies this danger, insofar as she 
mistakes a sensible instance of F for the Form of F (476e). For example, Polemarchus mistakes a 
single just action (that is, giving someone what is owed to him) for justice entire (331e-332a). 
However, this just action is incomplete and multiple. Being incomplete (that is, representing only 
one aspect of justice), it provides no guidance in some cases; and being “multiple” or “variable,” 
it is unjust in one application (for example, giving weapons back to a madman) and just in 
another (for example, returning money to a sane person). Immersed in the world of likenesses, 
the lovers of sights and sounds (Polemarchus included) love poetry. Poetic likenesses present an 
equal danger to the lover, insofar as she sets up a likeness as the criterion for truth. Like sensible 
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particulars, poetic likenesses are incomplete and multiple, in virtue of the fact that images, qua 
images, do not reproduce all and only the features of the original. Hence, a likeness is a likeness 
in some respects and not in others, just as a sensible particular is a likeness of a Form in some 
respects and not in others.  
However, the educational system of the kallipolis protects against the danger of 
conflating likenesses and originals, insofar as it is specifically designed to teach students to 
distinguish between images, sensibles and Forms. For example, a guardian’s education in 
mathematics and dialectic is intended to prompt her to exit the “cave” of likenesses and to enter 
the world of Forms, where she will recognize sensibles and their images for what they really are; 
namely, mere likenesses. Hence, in the kallipolis poetic likenesses (that is, correct images) do not 
pose a danger and so are not banned. Thus, while II and MI correctly capture some potentially 
deceptive features of likenesses, these features do nothing to explain Plato’s banishment of the 
µιµητικοί. 
 
 CONCLUSION  
This paper has centered on Republic X and a notion of µιµητική developed therein. But Republic 
VI introduces another kind of mimesis; namely, that of the philosopher rulers: 
No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the  
leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing  
with people. Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the  
same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he  
imitates [µιµεῖσθαί] them and tries to become as like them as he can [µάλιστα 
ἀφοµοιοῦσθαι]. … And if he should be compelled to put what he sees there into people’s 
characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his 
own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman [δηµιουργόν] of moderation, justice, 
and the whole of popular virtue? – He least of all. And when the majority realize that 
what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust 
us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by 
painters who use the divine model [οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγµατι χρώµενοι ζωγράφοι]? … 
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And I suppose that, as they work, they’d look [ἀποβλέποιεν] often in each direction 
towards the natures of justice, beauty, moderation, and the like, on the one hand, and 
towards those they’re trying to put into human beings, on the other. And in this way 
they’d mix and blend the various ways of life in the city until they produced a human 
image based on what Homer too called “the divine form and image” when it occurred 
among human beings (500b7-501b6). 
 
The philosopher king or queen is not unlike the demiurge of the Timaeus, who, in crafting the 
cosmos, imitates the “divine model” (that is, the Forms). I do not deny that mimesis of the Forms 
(with a view to producing sensible particulars) is a kind of “good mimesis,” analogical to (albeit 
distinct from) the concept of ‘mimesis’ developed in Republic III and X.liv What I deny is that 
such mimesis is the only form of good mimesis. The poetic mimesis of sensible particulars “as 
they are” - with a view to producing correct images of goods and bads - also constitutes good 
mimesis. Such “philosophic” mimesis would be careful to avoid deceptive contrasts that amplify 
goods and bads and would position human goods and bads in their rightful cosmic context. 
However, philosophers are not in the business of composing poetry, despite their special 
cognitive access to the Forms. Possessing genuine knowledge of virtue and value, they devote 
their time to fine deeds rather than poetic images thereof (599a-b). Nevertheless, they supervise 
the poets, communicating to them correct opinions about virtue and value. So, Socrates declares 
at 379a: 
 You and I, Adeimantus, aren’t poets, but we are founding a city. And it’s important for  
the founders to know the patterns on which the poets must base their stories and from  
which they mustn’t deviate. But we aren’t actually going to compose their poems for  
them (379a). 
 
Thus, unsurprisingly, in Republic X Socrates anticipates the possibility of imitative painters 
consulting the makers of artifacts, so as to gain correct opinion regarding fine artifacts (601e-
602a). Similarly, it seems, the kallipolis poets would consult the “craftsmen of the city’s 
freedom,” the philosopher kings and queens, who would communicate correct opinions about 
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virtue and value. Thus, knowledge of the Forms is not required of the good poet. To be sure, in 
an important sense, good poetic mimesis is grounded in the philosopher’s knowledge of the 
Forms, to the extent that philosophers supervise poets. Nevertheless, even if we depart with Plato 
on this point and insist that the good poet’s correct opinion need not be acquired through 
consultation with genuine “knowers of Forms,” Plato’s distinction between good and bad poetic 
mimesis still stands. It is not anchored to the theory of the Forms; it requires only that there be an 
objective sense in which an image can be said to be correct or incorrect. In other words, whether 
or not you believe in Forms, you can believe that skiagraphic techniques produces false 
appearances. Likewise, whether or not you believe in the Forms, you can believe that mixed 
pleasures produce hedonic illusions, in virtue of juxtaposing pleasure and pain.lv To be sure, you 
will only find these argument compelling so long as you think there is an objective answer to 
questions about goodness and badness, virtue and vice or pleasantness and painfulness; however, 
such a commitment to objectivity does not commit one to the theory of Forms. This focus on 
Forms has unfortunately obscured Plato’s compelling critique of tragedy as skiagraphic.lvi   
Why should we care about Socrates’ critique of poetry in Republic X, especially given 
that Republic X is commonly treated as a mere “excrescence” of the Republic proper.lvii The 
critique of Greek poetry in Republic Book X is absolutely integral to the entire project of the 
Republic, which is not only to define justice and injustice but also to show how justice and 
injustice come about in cities and souls. The Republic’s constant preoccupation with the latter 
(and the role of poetry therein) is evidenced by both the drama and dialectic of the Republic 
itself: Socrates’ mildly menacing assailants on their way to a festival featuring poetic 
performances; Adeimantus’ complaint that Greek poets persuade the youth that justice is only 
instrumentally good; the guardians’ revisionist education in music and poetry; the place of poetic 
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images in the Cave analogy; the critique of Greek poetry in Book X; and finally the Myth of Er, 
which arguably operates as a kind of psychically beneficial “rewriting” of Homeric poetry.lviii  
 Republic X, as I have interpreted it, clarifies the nature of Plato’s preoccupation with 
poetry in the Republic. Images do not pose a threat to justice; rather, false, skiagraphic 
appearances of virtue and value do, so long as they are permitted to freely circulate in the 
culture. Although we are bound to disagree with Plato’s authoritarian solution to this problem, 
we can surely appreciate the problem itself – even if we, like the Lovers of Sights and Sounds, 
deny the existence of the Forms.  
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xxiii C. Shaw, ‘Poetry and Hedonic Error in Plato’s Republic’, Phronesis 61 (2016), 373-96 argues for a strong  
continuity between the two books. According to Shaw, Republic X completes Book IX’s analysis of pleasure by 
examining a mixed pleasure of the soul; namely, “tragic pleasure.” In Shaw’s view, tragic pleasure involves the  
juxtaposition of painful grief with the dual pleasures of admiring the hero and appreciating the formal elements of  
the poem. While I agree with Shaw’s claim that juxtaposition is key to the experience of tragedy (as Socrates  
understands it), I deny that the experience of tragedy is that of tragic pleasure (as Shaw understands it). I also deny  
that Book X, like the Philebus, is in the business of classifying a mixed pleasure of the soul. In my view, the central  
experience of tragedy is that of pleasurable lamentation, and the relevant juxtapositions are those of the hero’s virtue  
and vice and fortune and misfortune. In effect, I am arguing for a weaker continuity between Books IX and X:  
Socrates imports the skiagraphia analogy from Book IX (where it is applied to pleasure) and applies it to tragedy in  
Book X.  
xxiv Book III is concerned with mimetic impersonation, whereas Book X is concerned with the production of 
mimetic appearances. This should come as no surprise, given that Book III addresses the guardians' education, 
which would have involved reciting and performing poetry (as was common educational practice in ancient Greece). 
xxv The terms “εἴδωλα,” “φαντάσµατα” and “φαινόµενα” often denote deceptive or spurious images (Janaway,  
Images of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts, 110-11 and Halliwell, Republic X with Translation and 
Commentary, 118-19). 
xxvi These points about variability will become important later, in developing the skiagraphia analogy.  
xxvii  I use the Greek term “µιµητικοί” throughout (rather than “imitators”), in order to keep clear my earlier point that  
Socrates does not target any and all imtation. Μιµητικοί are practitioners of a deceptive “τέχνη of imitation,” as 
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distinct from mimesis in general. Kelsey, Truth and τέχνη in Plato’s Philebus and Statesman (unpublished) argues  
that in the Philebus and the Statesman τέχνη is indifferent to truth – a mere “imitation” of true wisdom.  
xxviii  Also, the audience is not passive. For more on the audience’s “cognitive contribution” to the experience of  
tragedy, see V. Harte, ‘Republic X and the Role of the Audience in Art’, OSAP 38 (2010), 69-96. S. Jansen,  
‘Audience Psychology and Censorship in Plato’s Republic: The Problem of the Irrational Part’, Epoché 19.2 (2015) 
argues that the spirited part of the soul contributes much to the experience of tragedy. Cf. R. Sinpurwalla, 
‘Soul Division and Mimesis in Republic X’, in Destrée and F. Herrmann (edd.), Plato and the Poets (Brill, 2011),  
283-98.   
xxix See especially J.J. Pollitt, The Ancient View of Greek Art (YUP, 1974), 247-54 and Plantzos, ‘Wall- and Panel- 
Painting’, in T. Smith and D. Plantzos (edd.), A Companion to Greek Art, Vol. 1 (Blackwell, 2012), 172-9. The  
textual evidence comes primarily from scattered references in Plato and Aristotle, as well as book 35,  chapter 36 of  
Pliny the Elder’s Natural History, in which Pliny credits 5th century BCE Athenian Apollodorus with being the first  
to paint objects “as they appeared” – a practice Plutarch identifies with the mixture and toning down  
of shade [φθορὰν καὶ ἀπόχρωσιν] (De glor. Ath. 2, Mor. 346a). Pliny credits Apollodorus with inspiring the Greek  
realist painter, Zeuxis.  
xxx See respectively E. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting (Brill, 1978) and E.G. Pemberton, ‘A Note on Skiagraphia’,  
AJA 80.1 (1976), 82-4.  
xxxi The expansion of the traditional color palate was also important in this transition to representing reality as it  
appears. See H. Brecoulaki, ‘Greek Painting and the Challenge of Mimesis’, in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), A  
Companion to Ancient Aesthetics (Wiley, 2015), 223-31.  
xxxii The Philebus passages never use the term “skiagraphia;” however, the technique described at Phil. 42b-c 
matches perfectly with skiagraphia as it is described at Rep. 584-586. What is more, both texts apply skiagraphia to  
an analysis of mixed pleasure. For Plato’s suspicion of skiagraphia, see M.M Sassi, ‘Perceiving Colors’, in P. 
Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics (Wiley, 2015), 262-73 and Brecoulaki, Greek  
Painting and the Challenge of Mimesis.  
xxxiii Plantzos, Wall- and Panel-Painting claims skiagraphia was popular and blames the lack of extant  
skiagraphia on the fact that it commonly adorned walls and panels, which, unlike Greek sculpture and vase- 
paintings, disintegrated with the buildings it once decorated.  
xxxiv There is a long history of debate over what Socrates means by “is truly” [ἀληθῶς εἶναι] a carpenter. The Greek 
is consistent with either an ontological or veridical interpretation of “ἀληθῶς εἶναι.” So, Socrates could be referring 
to skiagraphic painting so as to make the point that foolish people mistake the painting of a carpenter for  a real life 
carpenter. See Halliwell, Plato: Republic 10 with Translation and Commentary, 119-20 and Janaway, Images of  
Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, 134 for this “ontological” interpretation. Alternatively, Socrates could be  
making the point that foolish people mistake the painting of a carpenter for a correct representation of a carpenter.  
See Belfiore, Plato’s Greatest Accusation Against Poetry, 40-50 and Moss, What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it  
Bad?, 422-23 for this “veridical” interpretation. My own suspicion is that Socrates intentionally trades  
on this ambiguity, in order to develop the analogy with poetry. Poetry involves veridical deception, because the  
audience is deceived into believing that Homer correctly represents virtue.   
xxxv In the literature the temptation has been to invoke the Sophist’s distinction between φανταστική and εἰκαστική. 
Whereas the latter produces an actual likeness of the object, the former “abandons truth” and produces an apparent 
likeness of the object (235c-236c). See especially N. Notomi, ‘Image-Making in Republic X and the Sophist’, in P.  
Destrée & F. Herrmann (edd.), Plato and the Poets (Brill, 2011), 299-326. However, not only does the Sophist never 
mention skiagraphia, the technique of the phantastic artist is different – i.e., distorting the proportions of the original 
in order to accommodate the perspective of the viewer, who is situated far below the artwork.  
xxxvi  Even here there are parallels. As I have said, skiagraphic painting and imitative poetry both produce illusions of 
fineness; for example, the painter produces the illusion of fine artifacts (601b-602a). Moreover, as we will see, both 
skiagraphia and tragedy produce illusions of intensity or magnitude.  
xxxvii  The analysis of mixed pleasure is interesting, in that Socrates initially categorizes such “so-called pleasures” as  
mere “relief from pain” (584c). However, the remainder of the analysis tacitly acknowledges that such pleasures are  
pleasures, albeit “less true” than unmixed pleasures. The Philebus echoes and even sharpens this point, especially at  
42b-c (which I will consider shortly).   
xxxviii  Notice, Plutarch also uses “ἀποχραίνω” to describe skiagraphia. See footnote 28.  
xxxix See Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting, who argues that skiagraphia produced illusions of color intensity. 
xl H.N. Fowler (transl.), Plato: Statesman, Philebus, Ion (Loeb Classical Library) (HUP, 1925).  
xli This is not to deny that the audience has an active role in constructing such illusions, but rather to point out that,   
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in the tragedy case, the artist also has an active role in constructing illusions. See Harte, Republic X and the Role of  
the Audience in Art.  
xlii Grand-Clemént, ‘Poikilia’, in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics (Wiley,  
2015),  408-11. 
xliii Grand-Clemént writes of poikilia: “… the fine play of colors and patterns intrigues and makes one wish to  
uncover the secret of its making. That is what lies behind the expression thauma idesthai. Wonder springs from the  
knowledge that beyond the apparent confusion there is order and rules, thought up by a skillful demiurge whose  
heroic or divine prototype could be Daedalus, Hephaestus, or Prometheus. The effect of poikilia induces an  
entrapment of the eye caused by the interplay of chromatic contrasts animating the patterns”  (‘Poikilia’, 413). 
xliv The tragedian also appeals to a part of the soul whose character is ποικίλον. Again, this points to the spectator’s  
role in constructing agathological and axiological illusions. See footnote 40.  
xlv From Republic 379d to 391e there are sixteen references to Achilles or his speeches, fourteen of which are 
critical. A. Hobbs, Plato and the Hero (CUP, 2000) emphasizes this point. However, she sees Achilles as the 
exemplar of the timocratic character.  
xlvi See S. Jansen, ‘Audience Psychology and Censorship in Plato’s Republic: The Problem of the Irrational Part’, 
Epoché 19.2 (2015) for an in-depth analysis of how poetry’s ethical illusions corrupt the souls of audience members. 
xlvii The tragedian produces a mixed pleasure in his audience; namely, the mixed pleasure of lamentation.  
xlviii See S. Jansen, ‘Audience Psychology and Censorship in Plato’s Republic: The Problem of the Irrational Part’, 
Epoché 19.2 (2015) for an in-depth analysis of how poetry’s ethical illusions corrupt the souls of audience members. 
xlix For II, see J. Marusic, ‘Poets and Mimesis in the Republic’, in P. Destrée & F. Herrmann (edd.), Plato and the  
Poets (Brill, 2011), 217-40.  
l The primary defender of MI, Jessica Moss, is not explicit about the sense in which sensibles or appearances are  
“changing, varied and contradictory” (What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?). Are sensibles and appearances  
“changing, varied and contradictory” with respect to other sensibles and appearances (respectively) or with respect  
to themselves (or both)?  
li J. Gould, ‘Plato and Performance’, Philosophy and Literature 20.1 (1996), 13-25.  
lii See V. Harte, ‘Plato’s Metaphysics’, in G Fine (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Plato (OUP, 2008), 191-216 for  
an argument against the view that sensibles distort or misrepresent the Forms. If Harte is right about this (and I think  
she is), then MI loses even more traction: mimetic appearances are not false in virtue of distorting their originals in  
the same way that sensibles distort Forms. 
liii Asmis, Art and Morality suggests that Plato promotes reformed poetry comprised of “likenesses” [εἰκόνες] of  
virtue. “Poet-technicians” (who follow the prescriptions of others regarding virtue) and “poet-creators” (who  
discover true virtue themselves) produce reformed poetry.  However, her analysis is a broad analysis of Plato’s  
works, rather than a focused analysis of Republic X.  
liv Why isn’t mimesis of Forms (which involves producing sensibles, not images) included in Republic X’s  
discussion of mimesis, given that the stated aim of the discussion is to define ‘mimesis in general?’ Strangely, Book  
X’s categorization of “makers” would classify both the philosopher king and the demiurge as “craftsmen” in  
contrast to “imitators.” Both look to the Forms with a view to producing sensibles. (In a similar vein, the  
carpenter looks to the Form of the couch with a view to producing the sensible couch.) Possibly, in setting out to  
define “µίµησις ὅλως” Socrates means to define what is “wholly” and “completely” mimesis. Certainly, the  
demiurge and philosopher king are mimetic in some respects, but (unlike the poet) they are genuinely  
“craftsmanlike” in other respects (i.e., in virtue of producing sensible artifacts reflective of Forms). So, they are not  
completely mimetic and hence fall outside of the Republic X discussion.  
lv To be sure, a philosopher’s pleasures are superior because they involve being filled with Forms. However,  
importantly, the tyrant’s pleasures are not grossly inferior because they involve being filled with images, but rather  
because they are thoroughly skiagraphic and, as a result, hedonically false. This criticism of the tyrant’s pleasures  
survives, whether or not we accept Forms.  
lvi One might object that my interpretation fails to reconcile the differing accounts of “µιµητική” or “imitativeness” 
in Republic X and III. In other words, how does the practice of copying appearances (as articulated in Republic X) 
connect with µιµητική as it is defined in Republic III; namely, seriously impersonating (in voice and body) many 
different characters, both good and bad? (As I have noted on p. 2, impersonation is nonequivalent to µιµητική, 
because impersonation of good characters is permitted and even encouraged, whereas poetic µιµητική is banned. See 
Belfiore, A Theory of Imitation in Plato’s Republic for the view that µιµητική essentially involves being “multiply 
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imitative” – i.e., imitating everything and anything. Ferrari, Plato and Poetry, 118-119 helpfully develops Belfiore’s 
view, adding that µιµητική involves “seriously” [σπουδῇ] impersonating multiple characters – i.e., impersonating 
them in a non-satirical way. While more needs to be said about what constitutes serious impersonation, this 
interpretation has the benefit of explaining why Socrates permits unserious, “playful” impersonation of bad 
characters [396d4-e1, 397a3].) First, it must be noted that Book III is concerned with mimetic impersonation, 
whereas Book X is concerned with the production of mimetic appearances. This should come as no surprise, given 
that Book III addresses the guardians' education, which would have involved reciting and performing poetry (as was 
common educational practice in ancient Greece). (See E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (HUP, 1963) for the nature of 
this common Greek educational practice, which involved impersonating poetry characters.) Thus, in Book III 
Socrates explores the effects of µιµητική on the µιµητικός – i.e., on the individual who, in reciting an performing 
poetry, impersonates various characters. The worry is that the µιµητικός becomes the multifarious, vicious 
characters she imitates. This difference in emphasis (between the two books) does not itself entail a splintering in in 
the concept of ‘µιµητική.’ Rather, impersonation and the production of appearances are two aspects of the very same 
practice. In “seriously impersonating” a tragic hero the actor (or poet) produces the appearance of a virtuous man 
undergoing terrible misfortune (603c). (In calling the poet an impersonator, Socrates is thinking about actors as 
extensions of the poet. Burnyeat remarks that Plato intends “this picture of the poet sprouting extensions of himself 
and his voice all over the theater” as grotesque [Art and Mimesis in Plato’s Republic, 61].) Put simply, 
impersonation is the medium through which performed or recited poetry produces its appearances. (This is not to 
say that imitative poetry communicates its appearances through impersonation exclusively, since Socrates 
recognizes musical mode and meter as distinct forms of mimesis [Rep. 399a-400a].) To be sure, more needs to be 
said about how “serious” impersonation departs from “playful” impersonation, such that the former (and not the 
latter) produces false appearances of virtue and value. However, there is no prima facie reason to suppose that such 
an explanation cannot be provided. In any case, the dominant interpretive strategy (i.e., PI and MI) shares the 
problem of unifying the discussions of µιµητική in Books III and X.  
lvii J. Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), 335. Cf. Else, Plato and Aristotle on Poetry, which  
also denies that Republic Book X is an integral part of the Republic.  
lviii See Destrée, ‘Plato on Tragic and Comic Pleasures’, in A. Denham (ed.), Plato on Art and Beauty (Palgrave,  
2012), 125-41. One exciting consquence of my interpretation is that it also removes an obstacle to understanding  
Plato’s dialogues as “good” or “revised” dramatic poetry. See S. Jansen, ‘Plato’s Phaedo as a Pedagogical Drama’,  
AP 33.2 (2013), 333-52 for the view that Plato intends the Phaedo as revised poetry. Interestingingly, the  
Phaedo does exactly what my interpretation of reformed poetry predicts: it represents Socrates’ character as uniform  
 
